“The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race.”
Quoted by the philosopher John Stuart Mill in his 1859 work On Liberty, this statement highlights how silencing an opinion deprives society of something valuable, whether that opinion is right or wrong. If an opinion is right, suppressing it deprives us of an opportunity to discover the truth; if it is wrong, engaging with it allows us to examine our own beliefs and understand the truth more clearly.
Although written more than a century and a half ago, Mill’s words remain profoundly relevant to democracies today. The freedom to express dissent is essential to a thriving democracy and is one of the defining features that distinguishes democratic systems from authoritarian regimes.
But recognising the importance of dissent is only the beginning. How does dissent translate into action? What institutional mechanisms are available to citizens who wish to challenge a decision, question those in power or demand accountability? And when these mechanisms exist, how effective are they in ensuring that citizens’ voices are heard?
Among the various ways of expressing dissent, street protests have emerged as a prominent means of bringing public grievances to the attention of those in power. Their ability to mobilise large numbers of people around a common cause gives them a distinctive form of collective strength and can compel those in power to take notice. From the Non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements during the Indian freedom struggle to post-Independence movements such as the JP Movement, the India Against Corruption movement, the farmers’ protests, the anti-CAA and NRC protests, and the more recent NEET protests, street mobilisation has repeatedly been used to challenge authority and demand change.
Yet, a question often arises: are street protests justified in a constitutional democracy, particularly when other mechanisms for expressing dissent and seeking redress are available?
This brings us to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s views on constitutional methods and his warning against what he called the “Grammar of Anarchy.”
On 25 November 1949, while addressing the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Ambedkar stressed that once constitutional methods were available, people should use them to achieve social and economic change rather than resorting to methods such as civil disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha. He described these methods as the “Grammar of Anarchy.”
In recent years, this passage has often been invoked by those in power to question the legitimacy of street protests, with protesters being told that their methods are unconstitutional. But does Dr. Ambedkar’s warning settle the question of street protests in a democracy?
To examine this question, let us first consider the mechanisms available to an ordinary citizen like you and me. If we disagree with a government decision or have a grievance that needs to be addressed, where do we begin?
In a representative democracy, we elect representatives to voice our concerns and act in our interests. But how responsive are they when citizens actually reach out?
A study involving emails sent to 727 MPs found that only 9.5% responded. The response rate was 12.2% among Lok Sabha MPs and just 2.4% among Rajya Sabha MPs. Although the study examined a specific type of request, these figures paint a concerning picture of how effectively direct communication translates into a response.
Citizens can also approach the government through formal grievance-redressal mechanisms. Yet, a Parliamentary Standing Committee identified instances in which complaints were transferred to other agencies, returned to the very departments being complained against, or closed without adequate reasons.
The problem extends beyond individual complaints. We elect representatives not only for their individual merits but also for the parties and ideologies they represent. Between 2022 and 2026, 111 sitting MPs and MLAs changed political parties after being elected. The issue goes beyond individual defections to entire parties departing from pre-poll alliances on whose platforms they sought votes, as seen in the Shiv Sena–BJP alliance in Maharashtra (2019) and the JD(U)–BJP alliance in Bihar (2022). Such shifts raise questions about whether elected representatives continue to reflect the mandate of the voters who elected them, potentially weakening public trust in democratic representation.
Meanwhile, Parliament, which is meant to provide a platform for dissent and dialogue and raise citizens’ concerns through their elected representatives, has itself struggled to provide adequate space for meaningful deliberation. During the Monsoon Session of 2026, the Lok Sabha functioned for just 15% of its scheduled time, while the Rajya Sabha functioned for 33%. Question Hour, which allows MPs to seek answers directly from the government, operated for barely 1% of its scheduled time in the Lok Sabha and 12% in the Rajya Sabha. Nine Bills were passed by the Lok Sabha without discussion. During the Monsoon Session of 2025, both Houses functioned for barely a third of their scheduled time. Only 16% of Bills in the 17th Lok Sabha were referred to committees for detailed scrutiny, compared with 71% in the 15th Lok Sabha.
These figures point to a deeper concern than the loss of parliamentary time. Repeated disruptions and the obstruction of proceedings leave little room for sustained debate, legislative scrutiny and meaningful engagement between the government and the opposition.
The media, too, widely regarded as the fourth pillar of democracy, is expected to scrutinise those in power, hold them accountable and facilitate informed public debate. However, sections of the mainstream media appear increasingly distant from the ground realities and everyday concerns of citizens. The growing prominence of sensationalism, shouting matches in television debates, unverified reports, fake news and the propagation of misleading narratives raises serious questions about the quality and credibility of news coverage. Interestingly, US Ambassador Sergio Gor recently remarked that Indian television news debates became “crazier” as the evening progressed, while also expressing concern about the prevalence of fake news.
So, when citizens’ grievances remain unresolved despite attempts to address them individually through grievance-redressal mechanisms or collectively through elected representatives, taking to the streets becomes a way to make their voices heard. While street protests cannot be the solution to every problem or government failure, nor can the size of a gathering automatically be taken as a reflection of wider public opinion, they should not be dismissed as anti-constitutional or anti-national. Their primary purpose should be to bring grievances to the attention of those in power and prompt them to examine the concerns being raised.
Street protests certainly do not replace the formal constitutional order but can serve as a means of demanding accountability and reform when existing mechanisms fall short. They remain a legitimate form of dissent when conducted peacefully and non-violently, rooted in genuine public grievances, driven by voluntary participation and guided by a shared purpose, ideally aimed at bringing about institutional reform.
But what happens when street protests move beyond demanding accountability and reform, begin portraying democratic institutions as extensions of the ruling party, and question their very legitimacy?
In October 2026, 44 Harvard scholars and professionals raised concerns about attacks on India’s constitutional institutions, including the Election Commission and the Supreme Court. Separately, over 400 Indian-origin academics, researchers and alumni associated with leading international universities expressed concern over protests they viewed as undermining India’s democratic institutions. These developments highlight the need to examine collective mobilisation within its broader political context, as protests and public campaigns can, in certain circumstances, be strategically exploited by actors pursuing ulterior objectives, including efforts to weaken institutional credibility and generate instability.
Recently, Former Chief Justice of India D. Y. Chandrachud warned against declining trust in democratic institutions, stating, “We are today living in an age where everybody wants to bring down every institution in a democracy.”
Citizens have every right to disagree with remarks made by the Chief Justice of India that prompted the formation of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), raise concerns about irregularities in competitive examinations and recruitment systems, or question the EC’s handling of electoral rolls amid the recent controversy. However, such instances should not automatically lead to a complete loss of trust in these institutions.
What happens when citizens lose faith in democratic institutions? In recent years, neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have witnessed political unrest, with declining public trust in institutions contributing to wider political instability and social disorder. However, it would be simplistic to draw direct parallels between these countries and India, which presents a more nuanced picture. Certainly, India is far from a perfect democracy, and its institutions have their share of shortcomings. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that Indian democracy has deep-rooted foundations, shaped not only by its constitutional framework but also by a longstanding democratic ethos and institutional traditions that have evolved. Its institutions also operate within a framework of constitutional checks, accountability and public scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has, at several crucial moments, acted as a check on government power and upheld constitutional principles. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), it established the Basic Structure Doctrine, limiting Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1997), it addressed political interference in corruption investigations and emphasised the need for independent investigative agencies. In 2012, the Court cancelled 122 telecom licences issued through the 2G spectrum allocation process, holding the allocation process arbitrary and unconstitutional, and in 2024 it struck down the Electoral Bonds Scheme, upholding voters’ right to information. More recently, during the CJP demonstrations, it issued directions to protect protesters and, in September 2026, quashed specified FIRs arising from student protests. These instances demonstrate the judiciary’s role in holding those in power accountable and safeguarding citizens’ constitutional rights.
Since 1951-52, the ECI has overseen 18 Lok Sabha and approximately 404 State and UT Assembly general elections, largely upholding electoral fairness despite pressures from the executive and ruling parties. Its evolution from a relatively low-profile body to a more assertive and influential institution, particularly since the 1990s, was marked by stricter enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct, the introduction of voter ID cards, deployment of election observers and measures to protect vulnerable voters. These initiatives helped strengthen its institutional autonomy and establish its reputation as a relatively neutral electoral referee, trusted by political parties across the spectrum. While its recent decisions and functioning are open to question and must remain subject to scrutiny and accountability, this does not, by itself, establish that the institution as a whole has been compromised.
For opposition parties, pointing out irregularities in the electoral process and holding the government accountable are both their right and their duty. However, it would be hypocritical and selective to question the fairness of the electoral process when they lose an election in one state, yet remain silent about the same institution when they win in another. Accountability requires not only consistent scrutiny, irrespective of electoral outcomes, but also a willingness to substantiate allegations and pursue them through appropriate institutional channels.
Citizens, therefore, should not lose faith in these institutions but can draw lessons from instances where they have engaged with the government and democratic institutions through constructive and collaborative approaches. Dissent and institutional legitimacy need not be in conflict. The Right to Information (RTI) movement engaged with government institutions through public hearings, protests and sustained advocacy, pressuring authorities to disclose public records and address corruption. It also worked with civil society, legal experts and legislators to push for legislation, ultimately contributing to the enactment of the RTI Act, 2005. Similarly, the Forest Rights Movement sought legal recognition of the rights of forest-dwelling communities. Sustained campaigns and engagement with the legislative process contributed to the enactment of the Forest Rights Act.
In both cases, collective mobilisation went beyond identifying shortcomings; it put forward demands for reform and worked towards concrete institutional and legal solutions. Citizens can engage constructively with democratic institutions by acknowledging the areas in which the government has made progress while also questioning its shortcomings, raising grievances, offering constructive suggestions and proposing alternatives. Recognising what has been achieved should go hand in hand with pressing the government to address what remains inadequate or unfulfilled. Blanket criticism, without acknowledging progress or putting forward constructive alternatives, is unlikely to contribute meaningfully to institutional improvement. The objective of dissent should not merely be to oppose or seek the removal of those in authority, but also to contribute to improving the institutions and systems through which democracy functions.
While citizens have a responsibility to engage constructively with democratic institutions, the greater responsibility lies with these institutions themselves to earn and maintain public trust. As Barack Obama observed in his 2018 Nelson Mandela Annual Lecture, “Democracy depends on strong institutions,” alongside freedom of expression, a free press, the right to protest, an independent judiciary and checks and balances. These elements are not mutually exclusive; they are essential to a functioning democracy.
For institutions to retain public confidence, they must acknowledge mistakes and irregularities, take corrective action, establish effective oversight mechanisms and prevent their recurrence. Equally important are continuous dialogue and active citizen participation to bridge the state-citizen divide. Ultimately, public trust must be earned through transparency, accountability, participation, fairness and a willingness to address citizens’ concerns.
As discussed earlier, existing mechanisms of representation and grievance redressal have their limitations. However, it is equally important to recognise the efforts being made and the reforms being considered to address some of these shortcomings.
At the level of political representation, one proposal that has periodically entered India’s democratic discourse is the Right to Recall. It would allow voters, under specified conditions, to initiate the removal of elected representatives before the completion of their term, thereby making them answerable to their constituents throughout their tenure. The idea has featured in Indian parliamentary discussions since 1959 and has received support from figures such as Jayaprakash Narayan and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It was raised again by Rajya Sabha MP Raghav Chadha in February 2026. At the state level, provisions exist in some states allowing voters to recall municipal functionaries through a direct vote by secret ballot, subject to the proposal receiving the support of three-fourths of the elected council. However, proposals to introduce such a mechanism at the MP and MLA levels have not received similar support. While the mechanism has its own merits and limitations, including concerns about possible political misuse and instability, it remains one of the proposed ways of strengthening accountability between elections.
Another area of discussion is the reform of the Anti-Defection Law. Proposals in this regard include transferring disqualification decisions from the Speaker to an independent adjudicatory authority with prescribed timelines; requiring legislators who resign from the party on whose ticket they were elected to vacate their seats and seek a fresh mandate; revisiting the two-thirds merger exception to prevent its misuse in facilitating mass defections; restricting party whips to important votes while allowing legislators greater freedom to express their views and vote independently on other matters.
Beyond political representation, institutional responsiveness also depends on how effectively government authorities address the everyday grievances of citizens. One initiative in this direction is the Centralised Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System (CPGRAMS), an online platform that enables citizens to lodge and track grievances against public authorities across government ministries and departments. In April 2024, the Commonwealth Secretariat recognised CPGRAMS as a best practice in public-service delivery and shared it with other member countries.
Such initiatives reflect efforts to make government more accessible and provide citizens with formal channels to raise their concerns and seek redress. We should focus on strengthening these mechanisms to ensure institutional trust, rather than making street protests the default means of expressing every grievance.
This article lays the groundwork for a series examining the factors that have contributed to socio-economic and political instability in neighbouring and other selected countries. Each subsequent article will focus on one country, exploring the causes and consequences of civil unrest, the state of its democratic institutions, how they responded and functioned during these periods, and the role played by various stakeholders. The broader objective of examining these case studies is to draw parallels with the Indian context and identify lessons that India can learn from these experiences.
Ishant Deshmukh, Research Assistant, Jnana Prabodhini – Social Sciences Study Centre


The article is very well-articulated, thoughtfully structured and thought-provoking, while also offering a balanced perspective.
Particularly, the flow of the article.. While reading, whenever I found myself thinking about a particular aspect or question raised in one paragraph, the subsequent paragraphs either addressed it or took the discussion forward in that direction.
The references, examples and explanations are also simple and accessible, making even complex constitutional and political questions understandable to someone without prior domain knowledge.
Ishant,
Congratulations for a well-thought off article. Quite balanced and facts based. I feel–
1. Democracy is only the ‘better evil’, not a substitute to the character building of the citizens.
2. Power enjoyed by the institutions make them oblivious to the cry of people. Judiciary is no exception.
3. Multi-party democracy and a two-party democracy have been experienced by the world. The human instinct of corrupting the power is uniform throughout the world.
4. Gandhi knew when to withdraw the agitation, the Gen Z has yet to learn it. How to guard against the Deep State forces using a genuine unrest for Regime Change, is an un-resolved issue.
5. The inability of human conscience to fall prey to fake narratives and malicious media is of a grave concern.
6. Indian masses deserve benevolent (?) dictatorship like China, if material progress is the Goal. Our traditional value system would not allow that. Therefore, the make and break of progress is the price to be paid by the society as a whole.
Congrats again for opening the dialogue. Awaiting further case studies.
— Subhash Deshpande.